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42 J.B. Lethbridge 
reading and preaching manuals, and in a still older tradition, the ancient treatment 
of Homer. But criticism seeks first to understand before applying or appropriating. 
Ruminating on a text is rather a process of first creating the full presence with the 
author, under his or her guidance. 
Picasso is supposed to have said that when he was five he could draw like Raphael, 
but that it took him a whole life time to learn to draw like a child. Practical criticism 
is approaching its centenary; too adult for the wisdom of the child, it might now be 
adult enough to be childlike. 
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Some Reflections on the Place 
of Aesthetics and Politics in 
American Studies 
PHILIPP SCHWEIGHAUSER + 
Allow m~ to be.gin with a personal anecdote. 1 In the early noughties'. I par~icipated in an mtens1ve, week-long workshop on contemporary Amencan literature 
that brought one eminent European literary scholar and four major U.S. writers 
and literary scholars to Austria to discuss recent developments in American 
literary production with a group of around fifty workshop participants. The title 
of the event promised that we would seek to do justice to both the diversity of the 
contemporary literary scene and the aesthetic dimension of literary works. As far as 
diversity is concerned, the selection of the American speakers was felicitous: they 
were two men and two women from the United States' four largest ethnic groups: 
Mexican-American, Asian-American, African-American, and Anglo-American. 
The European was a Frenchman. The division of labor was clear from the outset: 
while the Americans both represented and highlighted the cultural diversity of 
contemporary American literature, the Frenchman stressed aesthetic continuities. 
During the intellectually stimulating week we spent in Austria, one fundamental 
question about the present and the future of American Studies kept cropping up, 
leading to heated debates: what should Americanists study given the broad scope of 
American Studies? That expansiveness is due not only to the cultural diversity of the 
country but also to the multidisciplinarity of the field and the variety of theoretical 
frameworks, methodologies, and ideological convictions that vie for Americanists' 
allegiance. Yet in the discussions we had, the options at times seemed reduced to 
two. Doing American Studies, one either did politics in the sense that one critically 
engaged with the ideological subtexts of U.S. literary texts and focused on the cultural 
work these texts do-that was, by and large, the American scholars' choice-or one 
did aesthetics in the sense that one insisted on the differentness of literary language 
and valorized formally innovative texts that refuse to assimilate themselves to the 
I. Philipp Schweighauser, University of Basel. 
1 This essay is based on my inaugural lecture of the same title, which I gave at the University 
of Basel on May 19, 2009. I am attempting to retain some of the oral quality of that lecture. 
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languages we already have for speaking about the world-that was, very roughly, the 
French scholar's choice. 
It struck me then, and it strikes me now that this binary choice-that between 
doing politics and doing aesthetics-is a false choice. At the same time, I must admit 
that if a gun was put to my head, say by Judith Butler or Wolfgang Iser, and I had 
to decide between politics and aesthetics-a position that I would find awkward 
not only because a gun is put to my head-I would opt for aesthetics. But what do I 
mean by aesthetics? And where does politics come in? Let me begin answering these 
questions with two caveats. First, in declaring a greater interest in aesthetic than 
in political questions, I do not intend to dismiss more overtly political approaches 
to literature and culture such as feminism, gender studies, Marxism, postcolonial 
theory, ecocriticism, and the important work that the New Americanists do. These 
various approaches not only allow us to see things in literary texts that we would 
not see without them; they have also sharpened our awareness of the costs of 
exceptionalism, melting pot ideology, and various forms of social discrimination. 
Moreover, they have greatly expanded the canon of texts that are appreciated, taught, 
and read. Both American Studies and American literature are all the richer for 
them. My second caveat is this: my preference for aesthetics over politics is neither 
apolitical nor covertly political in a liberal-humanist sense. 
What aestheticians have taught me, though, is to pay attention to a dimension of 
literary experience that tends to be sidelined in the highly politicized mainstream of a 
field whose major academic institution, the American Studies Association, organizes 
annual meetings with titles such as "Beyond the Logic of Debt, Toward an Ethics 
of Collective Dissent" (Washington, DC., November 21-24, 2013) and "The (Re) 
production of Misery and the Ways of Resistance" (Toronto, October 8-11, 2015). 
Reading aesthetic theory side by side with New Americanists' latest interventions 
not only reminds me that studying literary texts means studying works of art. It 
also reminds me that any inquiry into the individual and social functions of literary 
texts that is worth its salt must tackle the specific forms in which these functions 
are performed. Aesthetic theory reminds me, in other words, of the inextricable 
intertwinement of literary form and function. In the valuable and necessary attempt 
to judge texts based on the extent to which they enact social protest, give a voice 
to the outcasts of American society or provide windows onto different, often 
marginalized ways of being, the complexity of this relationship between form and 
function is all too often ignored. Do not get me wrong: I fully share the indignation at 
social injustice that fuels the more politicized versions of American Studies. But I find 
that many of them subscribe, most often implicitly, to theories of the relationship 
between literature and what we call "reality" that fall behind some of the most basic 
insights reached by the Russian Formalists in the early twentieth century and the 
Frankfurt School at midcentury. 
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In their different ways, Victor Shklovsky's reflections on the defamiliarizing or 
enstranging power of art and Theodor Adorno's theorization of the negativity of 
art and of the paradox that the most hermetic literary works might actually be the 
most social remind us that art is neither a transparent window onto the world nor 
its mirror. Thinkers such as these remind us that it makes a great difference whether 
cultural critique is staged in language that aims at communicative transparency so 
as to be immediately intelligible or in language that is difficult and recalcitrant, and 
which refuses to conform to the languages we already have for speaking about the 
world. Moreover, Shklovsky and Adorno invite us to think hard about whether, just 
maybe, the second option-difficult, recalcitrant literature, in short, the modernist 
heritage and everything that had led up to it-might not be the preferred option. 
Clearly, Shklovsky and Adorno urge us to ponder such questions in highly different 
ways. Shklovsky's primary concerns were, first, the question of what makes literature 
literature and, second, the question of what the experience of art does with and to 
our perception of both artworks and the world at large. By way of contrast, Adorno's 
work is much more explicitly political in orientation. His clear-sighted engagement 
with both the Western philosophical heritage and the Marxist tradition has given us 
what are arguably the most sustained reflections on the intricate connections between 
literary forms and functions, and it seems clear that any talk about the relationship 
between aesthetics and politics must grapple with Adorno's Aesthetic Theory. At the 
same time, it would be wrong to draw too sharp a dividing line between the Russian 
Formalist and the Frankfurt School theorist. True, in contemporary American 
Studies, "formalism" has a bad name since it connotes ahistoricism and apoliticism.2 
As I see it, though, this is a misunderstanding, at least as far as the Russian Formalists 
are concerned. Let us consider a particularly prominent example: Shklovsky's essay 
"Art as Device." 
In this influential text, Shklovsky probes two different but related questions: what 
constitutes the specificity of artistic form? What is the function of art? The most 
condensed answer to these questions appears in the essay's three most often-quoted 
paragraphs: 
Automatization eats away at things, at clothes, at furniture, at our 
wives, and at our fear of war. 
If the complex life of many people takes place entirely on the level of 
the unconscious, then it's as if this life had never been. 
And so, in order to return sensation to our limbs, in order to make us 
feel objects, to make a stone feel stony, man has been given the tool 
of art. The purpose of art, then, is to lead us to a knowledge of a thing 
through the organ of sight instead of recognition. By "enstranging" 
b Note, though, the emergence, in recent years, of the New Formalisme (Levinson, 2007). 
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objects and complicating form, the device of art makes perception long 
and "laborious." The perceptual process in art has a purpose all its own 
and ought to be extended to the fullest. Art is a means of experiencing 
the process of creativity. The artifact itself is quite unimportant. 
(Shklovsky, 2009: 5-6; emphasis in original) 
For Shklovsky, the forms of art-be it the linguistic structures of the verbal works 
of art we call literary texts or the configurations of paint on a canvas-differ 
significantly from the forms we encounter in non-artistic objects. Artistic form is 
difficult, "complicating form" in that it impedes the ready assimilation of what we 
see (or, we should add, hear, smell, touch, or taste) to what we already know. Thus, 
art interferes with our habitual processes of perception and renders objects that 
have become all familiar to us unfamiliar and strange again: from Dos Passos's New 
York to Jimi Hendrix's Star-Spangled Banner. Art, then, makes objects strange, 
"enstranges" them, removing them from our automatized perception so that we 
can really see and hear (instead of recognize) them again. Art gives us a strangely 
new perspective on the world, thus refreshing our sense of life. And in doing this, 
art returns to us the surprise and amazement we have felt as children when we saw 
a flower, sand, and snow for the very first time. By virtue of its difficult forms, art 
jolts us out of our conventionalized modes of perception to enable us to perceive and 
experience the world anew. 
Considering the examples Shklovsky gives, though, we should not overemphasize 
his own comparison of aesthetic and childlike experience. After all, Shklovsky's 
first example is a passage from Tolstoy's brief essay "Shame!" in which the author 
adds a note after the description of a flogging: "Just why this stupid, savage method 
of inflicting pain and no other: such as pricking the shoulder or some such other 
part of the body with needles, squeezing somebody's hands or feet in a vise, etc." 
(Tolstoy, qtd. in Shklovsky, 2009: 6). Tolstoy here enstranges "flogging," making us 
aware of the excruciating pain that this practice actually inflicts. Thus, he strives to 
deautomatize our perception, allowing us a glimpse into a world of pain to which 
our repeated exposure to mass-medial accounts of torture may well have numbed us. 
Shklovsky's second example is also from Tolstoy, this time from a short story entitled 
"Kholstomer" that features a horse pondering the concept of property: 
The words "my horse" referred to me, a living horse, and this seemed 
to me just as strange as the words "my land," "my air" or "my water." 
And yet, these words had an enormous impact on me. [ ... ] As my 
observations grew, [ ... ] I became increasingly convinced that this 
concept of mine was invalid not only for us horses but also for human 
folk, i.e., that it represents nothing more than man's base and beastly 
instinct to claim property for himself. (Tolstoy, qtd. in Shklovsky, 
2009: 7; emphasis in original) 
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Shklovsky's choice of examples in an essay written on the eve of the Russian 
Revolution is anything but innocent; it is certainly neither apolitical nor ahistorical. 
And this is true not only for Shklovsky's own Russian context of 1917 but also for 
early-twenty-first-century America, a nation that condones torture in the so-called 
war on terror and has never quite been able to disentangle its promise of"life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness" from the origin of the phrase in Locke's triad of natural 
rights: "life, liberty, and estate" (Locke, 1988: 323)-the three elements that make up 
Locke' s notion of "property." 
The point I wish to make is not that Russian Formalism has a-however 
covert-political agenda comparable to that of more overtly political frameworks 
such as Marxism and critical race theory. What a focus on Shklovsky's choice of 
examples helps literary scholars understand, though, is two things: first, that the 
cultural work literary texts do is strongly contingent on their forms; second, that 
any political impact a literary text may have depends on the changes it effects in 
readers' perception of the world. And this brings us to the question of aesthetics. 
The term was coined by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in his 1735 Magisterarbeit 
(M.A. Thesis) Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, which 
is available in English translation under the title Reflections on Poetry. This slim book 
contains a brief sketch of a future discipline of aesthetics that is worked out more 
systematically in Baumgarten's two-volume Aesthetica of 1750 and 1758. In the 
first paragraph of the Aesthetica, Baumgarten defines aesthetics thus: "AESTHETICA 
(theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulchre cogitandi, ars analogi 
rationis) est scientia cognitionis sensitivae" (Baumgarten, 1954: § 1, I: 60). In Jeffrey 
Barnouw's translation, which includes helpful glosses in square brackets: "Aesthetics, 
as the theory of the liberal arts, lower-level epistemology [gnoseologia inferior], the 
art of thinking finely [literally, beautifully, ars pulchre cogitandi], and the art of the 
analogy of reason [i.e., the associative or natural-sign-based capacity of empirical 
inference common to man and higher animals], is the science of sensuous cognition" 
(Barnouw, 1988: 324). 
Baumgarten here presents more than one definition, and these definitions are 
not easily compatible. As various commentators have pointed out, we may assume 
that Baumgarten uses the more traditional descriptions mainly to gently introduce 
his readers to a new science. Once one strips the definition from these, a two-part 
core remains: aesthetics is the art of thinking finely and the science of sensuous 
cognition (Barck, Kliche and Heininger, 2000: 326). Of these, it is the latter that has 
had the greatest impact on recent reflections on aesthetics. Clearly, this definition of 
aesthetics diverges from most laypersons' as well as many a scholars' understanding 
of the term. As Wolfgang Welsch points out, 
the answer given by the encyclopedias is clear. The Italian Enciclopedia 
Filosofica defines aesthetics as "disciplina filosofica che ha per 
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oggetto la bellezza e l'arte." Correspondingly, the French Vocabulaire 
d'Esthetique determines aesthetics as "etude reflexive du beau" and 
"philosophie et science de l'art." The Academic American Encyclopedia 
says: "Aesthetics is the branch of philosophy that aims to establish the 
general principles of art and beauty." And the German Historisches 
Worterbuch der Philosophie explains (a bit more complicatedly, 
because it is German): "Das Wort '.Asthetik' hat sich als Titel des 
Zweiges der Philosophie eingebiirgert, in dem sie sich den Kiinsten 
und dem Schonen [ ... ] zuwendet." (Welsch, 1997: 18)3 
Despite the formidable weight of these sources, I join Welsch, Barnouw, Dagmar 
Mirbach, and Eberhard Ortland in returning to Baumgarten's original definition 
of "aesthetics" as "the science of sensuous cognition." What does this imply? With 
respect to art-which is but one possible object of aesthetic r~flection-a return to 
Baumgarten invites us to consider works of art as specific forms of cognition or specific 
forms of perceiving and knowing the world. Understood thus, art mediates, contains, 
and impacts processes of sensuous cognition. Based as it is on the Greek words 
aistheta (things perceptible by the senses) and aisthesis (sensation, both in the sense 
of external sense perception and inner sense or feeling), the very term "aesthetics" 
reflects those concerns (Summers, 1998). Thus, when we engage with works of art, we 
engage with processes of sensuous perception: the artwork's perception of the world 
as well as our perception of artworks and how those processes of perception relate to 
our perception of the world outside of our encounters with art. This understanding 
of art informs not only Baumgarten's aesthetic theory but also Shklovsky's conviction 
that "The purpose of art, then, is to lead us to a knowledge of a thing through the 
organ of sight instead of recognition." And the very same understanding of art also 
informs Wolfgang Iser's reflections on how the cognitive experiences we make as we 
take walks in the fictional woods of literature reflect back on how we see ourselves 
and the world we really live in (Iser, 1993). So this is what art, including literature, 
can achieve: it can change our perception of ourselves and of the world around us. 
Clearly, those changes may not always be political in nature, but the possibility of art 
to effect such perceptual changes lays the uncircumventable ground for any politics 
of representation. Aesthetic approaches to art allow us to think about that ground. 
Thus, in important ways, aesthetics comes before politics. 
What consequences could a shift to questions concerning aesthetics have for the 
practice ofliterary criticism? Most significantly, such a shift can sharpen our awareness 
of two dimensions ofliterary experience: the forms and the functions of literary texts. 
13 The Italian quote translates as "philosophical discipline that has beauty and art as its 
objects"; the French quotes as "study of the beautiful" and "philosophy and science of art"; 
and the German quote as "The word 'aesthetics' has taken hold as the title of that branch of 
philosophy that deals with the arts and the beautiful." 
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If literary experience does something with and to our perception of the world and 
ourselves, and if the effect it has on us is contingent on the kinds of language writers 
use, we must stop reading literature as a vehicle for the communication of messages, 
voices, ideas or creeds. Instead, we should read literature as a specific language game 
that negotiates, intervenes in, affirms, and negates the language games that are played 
outside of literature. Literary works are neither mirrors of the world nor transparent 
windows onto the world. Nor are they channels for the communication of anything 
that exists prior to the literary text. Instead, literary texts invite us to ponder on 
the relations between the fictional worlds we enter in literary experience and our 
perception of the world as it already exists. This encounter is enabled by and takes 
place through the specific forms of literary works: their narrative strategies, their 
prosody, their tropes-in short, the arrangement ofletters and words on the page. To 
my mind, one of the most exciting questions we can ask about literature is this: what 
kinds of cognitive and social functions do literary forms perform as they enter into a 
dialogue with other symbolic forms circulating in social space? Aesthetics allows us 
to ask this question in productive ways. 
To illustrate what this means in the practical terms of literary criticism, let me 
turn to a specific literary text, a microstory by contemporary U.S. writer Diane 
Williams that I first encountered in the Austrian workshop with which the present 
essay begins. "There Should Be Nothing Remarkable" is told by an acutely intelligent, 
sophisticated, and disturbingly cold female narrative voice who begins her narrative 
with a report on reading "a lovey-dovey Hallmark card out loud" to her "old 
father." This is the action about which "[t]here should be nothing remarkable about" 
(Williams, 1990, 30) it. Yet the train of associations that follows upon the heels of this 
domestic scene is anything but unremarkable. Within one long sentence that takes up 
the entire first paragraph, the narrator transitions from what appears to be a moment 
of intergenerational care to a detached reflection upon the fate of an unidentified 
female "you" who is lured into the United States with the promise of a restaurant job 
but ends up "in a brothel, as a slave, in New York, San Francisco, or Colorado" (30). 
Then, the text briefly returns to the Hallmark card scene and ends with a childhood 
reflection on her father's jocularly absurd questions about "the difference between a 
duck" (31), which assume an eerie, oppressive quality in the narrator's recollection. 
The remaining three paragraphs alternate between the daughter-father relationship 
and the subaltern woman's lot. In the process, the initial scene is shown in a new 
light-eerily sexualized and with the power relations between the daughter and her 
old father reversed-and the narrator cynically brushes off the would-be-waitress's 
suffering as a sex slave: "Speaking for myself, the worst fate I can imagine would be 
a restaurant job of any kind" (31). As the story ends, the boundaries between the 
two scenes are fully erased: "or what is it which is the root of all evil-how you sign 
yourself away? physical beauty? You be my slave-you throw yourself at somebody's 
feet-I am yours-it is so cozy, what I have done. It is my idea of family" (31). 
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At first glance, "There Should Be Nothing Remarkable" cries out for a political 
reading. In its four short paragraphs, the story broaches issues of social stratification, 
racial discrimination, psychological violence, sexuality, and serious gender trouble. 
When we read about a woman "being smuggled into the United States" (30), we find 
ourselves involved in issues of migration, race, and ethnicity. When we read that 
the narrator can imagine no harsher fate than a restaurant job, we are confronted 
with questions of class and social distinction. When we read that the envelope that 
contains the Hallmark card and which the narrator presents to her father is "cocked, 
the card[ ... ] on the way out," her "hand on it" and that through all this, she remains 
"positively demure," with her "eyes cast shyly down," we immediately realize that 
there is an uncanny performance of sexuality and symbolic violence at work. Finally, 
when we read that the narrator's father used to ask his daughter questions that she 
could not possibly answer, we recognize a specifically American form of absurd 
humor but also encounter a form of psychological violence ithat is based on the 
unequal distribution of power among the sexes to which the daughter's sexualized 
envelope-spiel is a twisted response that changes the power differential between 
parent and child. 
For a political reading, what is especially intriguing about "There Should Be 
Nothing Remarkable" is the way in which different social categories are interlinked 
and reinforce one another. Thus, the woman that is brought into the United States to 
work as a sex slave is exploited on the basis of her gender, her ethnicity, and her social 
class. Similarly, when the narrator asserts that working in a restaurant is the worst 
fate she can imagine for herself, we are forced to realize that gender discrimination 
is all the more oppressive when it is linked to class oppression. Williams's story, 
in other words, forcefully illustrates what intersectionality theory discusses as an 
interlocking matrix of oppression in which several socially constructed categories 
reinforce one another to produce forms of subordination that function on a variety 
oflevels simultaneously (Crenshaw, 1989; Nash, 2008). 
An additional aspect of Williams's story that a political reading might focus on 
is its politics of representation. Who is this narrator, who glibly introduces the story 
of a woman who ends up as a sex slave with the words "please bear with me" (30), 
who imagines her father in the same position as the slave being worshipped by 
"prospective eaters [ ... ] before, during, or after being led off' (31), and who cruelly 
comments on the subaltern woman's fate by giving expression to her own revulsion 
at the mere idea of working in a restaurant? One may speculate that the narrator 
is a deeply troubled, well-educated, middle-class Anglo-American woman who is 
keenly aware of social injustices but appears to lack any kind of empathy for the 
disadvantaged. Again, we are reminded that gender and class intersect to produce 
complex forms of oppression. And we may ask, what gives this narrator the right to 
talk about another woman's fate in that manner? Such a question may in turn lead 
political readers to reflect on their own position of advantage vis-a-vis the slave 
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woman and the ethical quandaries of speaking about and for others. In Gayatri 
Spivak's terms, how can we unlearn our own privilege to gain the right to speak not 
for but to subalterns (Spivak, 1988)? 
In important ways, then, "There Should Be Nothing Remarkable" is a story about 
the interrelatedness of various forms of social oppression along the lines of race, 
ethnicity, sexuality, gender, and class. Yet while such a political reading does partial 
justice to Williams's story, it also largely ignores both the text's formal qualities and 
its status as a literary text. What could an aesthetic reading add to our understanding 
of this text? Such a reading might start by noting that it was published in its author's 
first collection of stories, entitled This Is about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the 
World, Time, and Fate. What is important to realize about Williams's title is that 
its megalomania is tongue in cheek. Lifted straight from R. B. Onians's magisterial 
history of ideas The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, 
the World, Time, and Fate, Williams's title gives expression to an exasperation with a 
seemingly innocent question that writers are often asked by readers and publishers: 
so what are your stories about? William's answer is this: they are about the body, 
the mind, the soul, the world, time, and fate. The verbal irony at work here-the 
mocking of the idea that literature must be about something-gestures toward an 
understanding of literary texts that considers them neither the representation of 
pre-existing objects, events, and situations nor political protest in literary form. Such 
an understanding of literature radically departs from the traditional understanding 
of literature as mimesis, which has dominated Western reflections on art since Plato 
and Aristotle. 
As Iser reminds us, the function of literary fictions is not mimesis of what 
already exists but the staging of that which does not exist yet, at least not in our 
own lives: "Why have we created this mode of staging, and why has it accompanied 
us throughout our history? The answer must certainly be the desire, not to repeat 
what is, but to gain access to what we otherwise cannot have" (Iser, 1989b: 282). 
How would such an understanding of fiction allow us to read Williams's microstory 
differently? It would prompt us to read it not as a more or less ethically viable 
comment on social inequality in the United States but as a world of make-believe, 
a world of as-if that allows us to experience, in our minds, other ways of living-be 
it that of the aloof narrator, that of the old father or that of the sex slave. And by 
allowing us to experience other ways of being in the world, Williams's story also 
invites us to experience the relationships obtaining between those other ways of 
living and our own since, in reading, "we are both ourselves and someone else" 
(Iser, 1989a: 244). To enter a fictional world is not to escape from our own world 
but to experience living in two worlds at the same time. Literary fictions, then, allow 
us vicariously to explore alternative ways of living our lives and are thus "means of 
overstepping the given, which is bound to cause a transformation of what is" (Iser, 
1989b: 268). Literature enables us to model alternative possibilities of being, thus 
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allowing us playfully to undermine the limitations of our existence-which may in 
turn change the way we perceive the life we really live. Thus, our walks in fictional 
woods may well have tangible real-world effects. Veering away from an explicitly 
political reading of "There Should Be Nothing Remarkable," then, has not led us 
away from politics entirely. But it has helped us grasp what enables fiction to have 
real-world effects in the first place. 
Yet Williams's apparent aversion to the question of what her stories are about 
also points us in a second direction. Perhaps, literary texts are ultimately less world-
creations than word-creations, i.e., verbal works of art. If we adopt this perspective, 
inquiries into the relations between fictional and empirical worlds are ultimately 
secondary. Instead, what counts in literary experience is what the text does with 
and to language. Approaching "There Should Be Nothing Remarkable" in this spirit 
allows us to see that it is very much a text about texts. Note the recurrence of words 
such as "mark," "sign" or "words" that refer to the process of writing: "remarkable," 
"Hallmark card," "words which are not your own," "I don't remember the words," 
"how you sign yourself away." Such self-reflexivity prompts us to look at the text 
itself rather than anything it may or may not represent. Crucially, this kind of self-
reflexivity is anything but apolitical; it makes us reflect on how we, in our own lives, 
use words that are not our own-Hallmark card-words, if you will-and how that 
makes us sign ourselves away. 
And once we have our eyes set on the forms ofWilliams's story and the functions 
those forms perform, we may also let ourselves be irritated by the narrator's extremely 
cruel tone, which may, perhaps, make us question our own, often sentimental and 
euphemistic ways of talking about the plights of others. An aesthetic reading, may, 
in other words, make us question the kind of Betroffenheit-a somewhat false and 
artificial performance of concern-that has a tendency to slip from Hallmark cards 
into our own speech. Again, aesthetic considerations have not led us away from 
politics. Instead, they have helped us understand that any consideration of a literary 
work's politics of representation that is worthy of the name must take a detour 
through considerations of literary forms and the impact of those forms on readers' 
perceptions of themselves and of the world. 
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